Financial Accounting Theory. (Registro nro. 680)

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000 -CABECERA
campo de control de longitud fija	12979nam a22001937a 4500
003 - NUMERO DE CONTROL DE IDENTIFICACIÓN
campo de control	OSt
005 - FECHA Y HORA DE LA ÚLTIMA TRANSACCIÓN
campo de control	20250402130448.0
008 - DATOS DE LONGITUD FIJA--INFORMACIÓN GENERAL
campo de control de longitud fija	220509b \|\|\|\|\|\|\|\| \|\|\|\| 00\| 0 eng d
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO (ISBN)
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro (ISBN)	978-0-13-298466-9
040 ## - FUENTE DE LA CATALOGACIÓN
Centro catalogador/agencia de origen	B-ISTTENA
041 ## - CÓDIGO DE LENGUA
Código de lengua del texto/banda sonora o título independiente	Eng
245 ## - MENCIÓN DE TÍTULO
Título	Financial Accounting Theory.
Mención de responsabilidad, etc	William R. Scott
250 ## - MENCIÓN DE EDICIÓN
Mención de edición	7ma Ed.
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Lugar de publicación, distribución, etc.	EE.UU
Nombre del editor, distribuidor, etc.	Megan Farrell
Fecha de publicación, distribución, etc.	2015
300 ## - DESCRIPCIÓN FÍSICA
Extensión	608 P.
Dimensiones	24 x 19 cm.
505 ## - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO
Nota de contenido con formato	CONTENTS <br/>1Introduction 1<br/>1.1 The Objective of This Book 1 <br/>1.2 Some Historical Perspective 1<br/>1.3 The 2007-2008 Market Meldowns 10<br/>1.4 Efficient Contracting 16<br/>1.5 A Note on Ethical Behaviour 18 <br/>1.6 Rules-Based versus Principles-Based Accounting Standards 20<br/>1.7 The Complexity of Information in Financial Accounting and Reporting 21<br/>1.8 The Role of Accounting Reasearch 21<br/>1.9 The Importance of Information Asymmetry 22<br/>1.10 The Fundamental Problem of Financial Accounting Theory 24<br/>1.11 Regulation as a Reaction to the Fundamental Problem 26<br/>1.12 The Organization of this Book 27<br/>1.12.1 Ideal Conditions 27<br/>1.12.2 Adverse Selection 27<br/>1.12.3 Moral Hazard 28<br/>1.12.4 Standard Setting 28<br/>1.12.5 The Process of Stnadard Setting 29<br/>1.13 Relevance of Financial Accounting Theory to Accounting Practice 32<br/>2 Accounting Under Ideal Conditions 37<br/>2.1 Overview 37<br/>2.2 The Present Value Model Under Certainty 38<br/>2.2.1 Summary 41<br/>2.3 The Present Value Model Under Uncertainty 41<br/>2.3.1 Summary 47 <br/>2.4 Examples of Present Value Accounting 48<br/>2.4.1 Embedded Value 48<br/>2.4.2 Reserve Recognition Accointing 49<br/>2.4.3 Critique of RRA 52<br/>2.4.4 Summary of RRA 56<br/>2.5 Historical Cost Accointing Revisited 56<br/>2.5.1 Comparison of Different Measurement Bases 56<br/>2.5.2 Conclusion 58<br/>2.6 The Non-Existence of True Net Income 58<br/>2.7 Conclusion to Accointing Under Ideal Conditions 59<br/>3 The Decision Usefulness Approach to Financial Reporting 72<br/>3.1 Overvie 72<br/>3.2 The Decision Usefulness Approach 73<br/>3.2.1 Summary 74<br/>3.3 Single-Person Decision Theory 74<br/>3.3.1 Decision Theory Applied 74 <br/>3.3.2 The Information System 78<br/>3.3.3 Information Defined 82 <br/>3.3.4 Summary 83<br/>3.4 The Rational, Risk-Averse Investor 83<br/>3.5 The Principle of Usefulness Diversification 85<br/>3.6 Increasing the Desicion Usefulness of financial Reporting 87<br/>3.6.1 Introduction 87<br/>3.6.2 Objectives of Management Discussion and Analysis 88<br/>3.6.3 An Example of MD&A Disclosure 89<br/>3.6.4 Is MD&A Decision Useful? 99<br/>3.6.5 Conclusion 101<br/>3.7 The Reaction of Professional Accounting Bodies to the Desicion Usefulness Appoach 102<br/>3.7.1 The Conceptual Framework 102<br/>3.7.2 Summary 107<br/>3.8 Conclusions on Desicion Usefulness 107<br/>4 Efficient Securities Markets 120 <br/>4.1 Overview 120<br/>4.2 Efficient Securities Markets 121<br/>4.2.1 The Meaning of Efficiency 121<br/>4.2.2 How Do Market Prices Fully Reflect All Available Information? 124<br/>4.2.3 summary 126<br/>4.3 Implications of Efficient Securities Markets for Financial Reporting 127<br/>4.3.1 Implications 127<br/>4.3.2 Summary 128 <br/>4.4 The Informativeness of Price 129<br/>4.4.1 A Logical Inconsistency 129<br/>4.4.2 Summary 132<br/>4.5 A Model of Cost of Capital 132 <br/>4.5.1 A Capital Asset Pricing Model 132<br/>4.5.2 Critique of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 135<br/>4.5.3 Summary 137 <br/>4.6 Information Asymmetry 137<br/>4.6.1 A Closer Look at Information Asymmetry 137<br/>4.6.2 Fundamental Value 140<br/>4.6.3 Summary 142<br/>4.7 The Social Significante of Securities Markets that Work Well 143<br/>4.8 Conclusions on Efficient Securities Markets 145<br/>5 The Value Relevance od Accounting Information 153<br/>5.1 Overiew 153<br/>5.2 Outline of the Research Problem 154<br/>5.2.1 Reasons for Market Response 154<br/>5.2.2 Finding the Market Response 156<br/>5.2.3 Separating Market-Wide and Firm-Specific Factors 156<br/>5.2.4 Comparing Returns and Income 157<br/>5.3 The Ball and Brown Study 159<br/>5.3.1 Methodology and Findings 159 <br/>5.3.2 Causation Versus Association 160<br/>5.3.3 Outcomes of the BB Study 162<br/>5.4 Earnings Response Coefficients 163<br/>5.4.1 Reasons for Differential Market Responce 163<br/>5.4.2 Implications of ERC Research 169<br/>5.4.3 Measuring Investors´ Earnings Expectations 170<br/>5.4.4 Summary 172<br/>5.5 A Caveat about the "Best" Accounting Policy 173<br/>5.6 The Value Relevance of Other Financial Statement Information 174<br/>5.7 Conclusions on Value Relevance 176 <br/>6 The Measurement Approach to Decision Usefulness 189<br/>6.1 Overiew 189 <br/>6.2 Are Securities Markets Fully Efficient? 191<br/>6.2.1 Introduction 191<br/>6.2.2 Prospect Theory 194 <br/>6.2.3 Is Beta Dead? 197<br/>6.2.4 Excess Stock Market Volatility 199<br/>6.2.5 Stock Market Bubbles 200<br/>6.2.6 Discussion of Securities Market Efficiency Versus Behavioural Finances 200<br/>6.3 Efficient Securities Market Anomalies 202<br/>6.4 Limits to Arbitrage 206<br/>6.5 A Defence of Average Investor Rationality 209<br/>6.5.1 Dropping Rational Expectations 209<br/>6.5.2 Dropping Cmmon Knowledg 211 <br/>6.6 Summary re Securities Market Inefficiencies 215 <br/>6.7 Conclusions About Securities Martek Efficiency and Investor Rationality 216<br/>6.8 Other Reasons Suppoting a Measurement Approach 219<br/>6.9 The Low Value Relevance of Financial Statement Information 219<br/>6.10 Ohlson´s Clean Surplus Theory 221 <br/>6.10.1 Three Formulae for Firm Value 221<br/>6.10.2 Earnings Persistence 225}<br/>6.10.3 Estimating Firm Value 227<br/>6.10.4 Empirical Studies of the Clean Surplus Model 230<br/>6.10.5 Summary 233<br/>6.11 Auditors´ Legal Liability 233<br/>6.12 Asymmetry of Investor Losses 236<br/>6.13 Conclusions on the Measurement Approach to Decision Usefulness 241<br/>7 Measurement Applications 252<br/>7.1 Overview 252<br/>7.2 Current Value Accounting 253<br/>7.2.1 Two Versions of Current Value Accounting 253<br/>7.2.2 Current Value Accounting and the Income Statement 255 <br/>7.2.3 Summary 256<br/>7.3 Longstanding Measurement Examples 256<br/>7.3.1 Accounts Receivable and Payable 256<br/>7.3.2 Cash Flows Fixed by Contract 256<br/>7.3.3 The Lower-of-Cost-or-Market Rule 257<br/>7.3.4 Revaluation Option for Property, Plant, and Equipment 258<br/>7.3.5 Impairment Test for Property, Plant, and Equipment 258 <br/>7.3.6 Summary 259.<br/>7.4 Financial Instruments Defined 259<br/>7.5 Primary Financial Instruments 259<br/>7.5.1 Standard Setters Back Down Somewhat on Fair Value Accounting 259<br/>7.5.2 Longer-Run Changes to Fair Value Accounting 261<br/>7.5.3 The Fair Value Option 262<br/>7.5.4 Loan Loss Provisioning 264<br/>7.5.5 Summary and Conclusions 266<br/>7.6 Fair Value Versus Historical Cost 267<br/>7.7 Liquidity Risk and Financial Reporting Quality 270<br/>7.8 Derecognition and Consolidation 271<br/>7.9 Derivative Financial Instruments 275<br/>7.9.1 Characteristics of Derivatives 275<br/>7.92 Hedge Accounting 278<br/>7.10 Conclusions on Accounting for Financial Instruments 281<br/>7.11 Accounting for Intangibles 282<br/>7.11.1 Introduction 282<br/>7.11.2 Accounting for Purchased Goodwill 283<br/>7.11.3 Self-Developed Goodwill 287<br/>7.11.4 The Clean Surplus Model<br/>Revisited 289<br/>7.11.5 Summary 289<br/>7.12 Reporting on Risk 290<br/>7.12.1 Beta Risk 290<br/>7.12.2 Why Do Firms Manage Firm- Specific Risk? 291<br/>7.12.3 Stock Market Reaction to Other Risks 292<br/>7.12.4 A Measurement Approach to Risk Reporting 294<br/>7.12.5 Summary 297<br/>7.13 Conclusions on Measurement Applications 297<br/>8 The Efficient Contracting Approach to Decision Usefulness 311<br/>8.1 Overview 311<br/>8.2 What Is Efficient Contracting Theory? 313<br/>8.3 Sources of Efficient Contracting Demand for Financial Accounting Information 314<br/>8.3.1 Lenders 314<br/>8.3.2 Shareholders 314<br/>8.4 Accounting Policies for Efficient Contracting 315<br/>8.4.1 Reliability 315<br/>8.4.2 Conservatism 316<br/>8.5 Contract Rigidity 318<br/>8.6 Employee Stock Options 322<br/>8.7 Discussion and Summary of ESO Expensing 329<br/>8.8 Distinguishing Efficiency and Opportunism in Contracting 330<br/>8.9 Summary of Efficient Contracting for Debt and Stewardship 334<br/>8.10 Implicit Contracts 335<br/>8.10.1 Definition and Empirical Evidence 335<br/>8.10.2 A Single-Period Non- Cooperative Game 336<br/>8.10.3 A Trust-Based Multi-Period Game 340<br/>8.10.4 Summary of Implicit Contracting 344<br/>8.11 Summary of Efficient Contracting 344<br/>9 An Analysis of Conflict 357<br/>9.1 Overview 357<br/>9.2 Agency Theory 358<br/>9.2.1 Introduction 358<br/>9.2.2 Agency Contracts Between Firm Owner and Manager 359<br/>9.3 Manager's Information Advantage 369<br/>9.3.1 Earnings Management 369<br/>9.3.2 The Revelation Principle 371<br/>9.3.3 Controlling Earnings Management 373<br/>9.3.4 Agency Theory with Psychological Norms 375<br/>9.4 Discussion and Summary 378<br/>9.5 Protecting Lenders from Manager Information Advantage 379<br/>9.6 Implications of Agency Theory for Accounting 383<br/>9.6.1 Is Two Better Than One? 383<br/>9.6.2 Rigidity of Contracts 387<br/>9.7 Reconciliation of Efficient Securities Market Theory with Economic Consequences 388<br/>9.8 Conclusions on the Analysis of Conflict 389<br/>10 Executive Compensation 403<br/>10.1 Overview 403<br/>10.2 Are Incentive Contracts Necessary! 404<br/>10.3 A Managerial Compensation Plan 407<br/>10.4 The Theory of Executive Compensation 409<br/>10.4.1 The Relative Proportions of Net Income and Share Price in Evaluating Manager Performance 409<br/>10.4.2 Short-Run Effort and Long- Run Effort 412<br/>10.4.3 The Role of Risk in Executive Compensation 415<br/>10.5 Empirical Compensation Research 420<br/>10.6 The Politics of Executive Compensation 422<br/>10.7 The Power Theory of Executive Compensation 428<br/>10.8 The Social Significance of Managerial Labour Markets that Work Well 431<br/>10.9 Conclusions on Executive Compensation 432<br/>11 Earnings Management 444<br/>11.1 Overview 444<br/>11.2 Patterns of Earnings Management 447<br/>11.3 Evidence of Earnings Management for Bonus Purposes 448<br/>11.4 Other Motivations for Earnings Management 454<br/>11.4.1 Other Contracting Motivations 454<br/>11.4.2 To Meet Investors' Earnings Expectations 455<br/>11.4.3 Stock Offerings 457<br/>11.5 The Good Side of Earnings Management 458<br/>11.5.1 Blocked Communication 459<br/>11.5.2 Empirical Evidence of Good Earnings Management 461<br/>11.6 The Bad Side of Earnings Management 465<br/>11.6.1 Opportunistic Earnings Management 465<br/>11.6.2 Do Managers Accept Securities Market Efficiency? 469<br/>11.6.3 Analyzing Managers' Speech to Detect Bad Earnings Management 471<br/>11.6.4 Implications for Accountants 472<br/>11.7 Conclusions on Earnings Management 472<br/>12 Standard Setting: Economic Issues 487<br/>12.1 Overview 487<br/>12.2 Regulation of Economic Activity 489<br/>12.3 Ways to Characterize Information Production 490<br/>12.4 First-Best Information Production 491<br/>12.5 Market Failures in the Production of Information 492<br/>12.5.1 Externalities and Free-Riding 492<br/>12.5.2 The Adverse Selection Problem 493<br/>12.5.3 The Moral Hazard Problem 493<br/>12.5.4 Unanimity 493<br/>12.6 Contractual Incentives for Information Production 494<br/>12.6.1 Examples of Contractual Incentives 494<br/>12.6.2 The Coase Theorem 495<br/>12.7 Market-Based Incentives for Information Production 497<br/>12.8 A Closer Look at Market-Based Incentives 497<br/>12.8.1 The Disclosure Principle 497<br/>12.8.2 Empirical Disclosure Principle Research 499<br/>12.8.3 Signalling 503<br/>12.8.4 Private Information: Search 505<br/>12.9 Are Firms Rewarded for Superior Disclosure? 506<br/>12.9.1 Theory 506<br/>12.9.2 Empirical Tests of Measures of Reporting Quality 509<br/>12.9.3 Is Estimation Risk Diversifiable? 511<br/>12.9.4 Conclusions 513<br/>12.10 Decentralized Regulation 514<br/>12.11 How Much Information Is Enough? 516<br/>12.12 Conclusions on Standard Setting Related to Economic Issues 519<br/>13 Standard Setting: Political Issues 530<br/>13.1 Overview 530<br/>13.2 Two Theories of Regulation 532<br/>13.2.1 The Public Interest Theory 532 <br/>13.2.2 The Interest Group Theory 532<br/>13.2.3 Which Theory of Regulation Applies to Standard Stting? 535<br/>13.3 Confict and Compromise:an Example of Constituency Conflic 535<br/>13.4 Distribution of the Benefits of Information,Regulation FD 536<br/>13.5 Criteria for Standard Setting 538<br/>13.5.1 Desicion Usefulness 538<br/>13.5.2 Reduction of Information Asymmetry 539<br/>13.5.3 Economic Consequences of New Standards 540<br/>13.5.4 Consensus 540<br/>13.5.5 Summary 541<br/>13.6 The Regulator´s Information Asymmetry 541 <br/>13.7 Standard Setting: Political Issues 530<br/>13.7.1 Convergence of Accounting Standards 546<br/>13.7.2 Effects of Customs and Institutions on Financial Reporting 548<br/>13.7.3 Enforcement of Accounting Stadards 550<br/>13.7.4 Benefits of Adopting High-Quality Accounting Standards 551<br/>13.7.5 The Realative Quality of IASB and FASB GAAP 554<br/>13.7.6 Should Standard Setters Compete? 55<br/>13.7.7 Sholud the Unite States Adopt IASB Standards? 556<br/>13.7.8 Summary of Accounting for International Capital Markets Intregration 558<br/>13.8 Conclusions and Summing Up 558<br/> <br/> <br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/> <br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/> <br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/> <br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/> <br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/><br/>
650 ## -
Término de materia o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada	Ingles B1
942 ## - ELEMENTOS DE PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL (KOHA)
Código de la institución [OBSOLETO]	B-ISTTENA
Tipo de ítem Koha	Libros
Fecha de Catalogación	09 / 06 / 2022.
Catalogador	Johnny G.
Fecha de adquisición	20/09/2018

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Localización permanente	Fecha de adquisición	Fuente de adquisición	Número de inventario	Código de barras	Número de copia	Costo, precio normal de compra	Tipo de ítem Koha
Instituto Superior Tecnológico Tena	09/20/2018	Donación	ISTT-CI-0067	ISTT-CI-0067	Eje. 1/1	50.00	Libros

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Financial Accounting Theory. (Registro nro. 680)